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Abstract. This paper proposes a simple continuous time model to analyze capital charges for
operational risk. We find that undercapitalized banks have less incentives to reduce their op-
erational risk exposure. We view operational risk charge as a tool to reduce the moral hazard
problem. Our results show, that only Advanced Measurement Approach may create appropriate
incentives to reduce the frequency of operational losses, while Basic Indicator Approach appears
counterproductive.
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1. Introduction
Banking regulation aims to discipline banks and to promote financial stability in the economy on
the whole. It relies on three pillars, capital requirements, market discipline, and supervisory review
process. Under Basel I, banks are required to hold capital for credit and market risk in order to be
insured against these risks. Under basel II, banks should also compute capital charge for operational
risk, that is defined as ’the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed systems
or from external events’. In other words, operational risk can rise as the result of some internal
factors like internal fraud, different aspects of business processes (staff, clients, products, workplace
safety), physical assets damage, business disruption, as well as external frauds, system failure and
execution. Since operational losses have a significant effect on the economy, it can be viewed as one
of the crucial subjects of banking regulation.
I would like to thank Frederic Deroian, Renaud Bourles, Nataliya Klemenko and seminar participants at IFC5,
Asset 2009, CEAFE 2010, for their valuable suggestions and remarks. Any errors remain my responsibility.
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Actually, in the light of basel II recommendation, operational risk capital charge can be computed
using Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), Standardized Approach (STA), or Advanced Measurement
Approach (AMA). According to BIA, banks must hold capital for operational risk that is equal to the
average over the previous three years of a fixed percentage of positive annual gross income (a proxy
of the level of operational risk exposure). Under the STA, that can be considered as a variant of
the BIA, banks’ activities are divided into eight business lines: corporate finance, trading and sales,
retail banking, commercial banking, payment and settlement, agency services, asset management,
and retail brokerage. For each business line, the corresponding capital charge is computed by
multiplying gross income by a factor assigned to that business line. The total capital charge is
obtained by summing capital charges over each business. It is important to note that the first two
approaches do not truly reflect bank’s exposure to operational risk. Indeed, operational capital
charge calculated following these approaches doesn’t take into account banks’ efforts to manage
and to mitigate their operational risk. On the contrary, the capital charge calculated under AMA
is more risk-sensitive.1 For each business line and loss type, the capital charge can be evaluated
as percentage of expected loss. Expected losses are equal to the product of an exposure indicator
(specified by the supervisor), by the probability of loss event, and by losses given event.
The inclusion of operational risk into the capital requirements framework has been severely crit-
icized. In contrast to credit and market risks, there is no evidence of an excessive exposure to
operational risk. Moreover, in order to absorb future losses, banks typically hold cash funds in
excess of the required capital. Hence, imposing operational risk capital charge may be counter pro-
ductive if it does not enhance banks’ incentives to manage and mitigate operational risk. Moreover,
there is no evidence that capital charge, computed under Basel II, will give banks incentives to
reduce their exposure to operational risk.
1For example: Basel II clause, 677. Under the AMA, a bank will be allowed to recognize the risk mitigating impact
of insurance in the measures of operational risk used for regulatory minimum capital requirements. The recognition
of insurance mitigation will be limited to 20% of the total operational risk capital charge calculated under the AMA.
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In this paper, we develop a continuous time model to examine the issue of operational risk capital
requirements. This study can be viewed as a first attempt to quantify capital charge for operational
risk based on an incentive approach. We consider a bank that faces two types of risks: credit risk and
operational risk. We represent credit risk by a Brownian motion and operational risk by a Poisson
process with constant intensity. The bank can reduce the frequency of operational losses by exerting
a costly effort.2 The regulator realizes random audit in order to observe bank’s effort and its level
of capital. She closes the bank as soon as its capital falls below the required level. Bank’s manager
chooses a dividend policy and an operational risk exposure to maximize the expected discounted
value of future dividend payments.
Firstly, we analyze the case without any operational risk capital charge. We find that the bank
holds capital in excess of the required credit risk capital requirements and decides to reduce its
operational risk exposure only when it is well-capitalized. The point is that, when the bank’s capital
is close to the liquidation threshold, the marginal value of internal funds becomes too high. Therefore,
in this case, it is not optimal to reduce operational risk exposure, i.e, the bank chooses to keep cash
inside to insure itself against credit risk. This provides a quite good rationale for operational risk
capital requirements. However, this capital requirements would be counterproductive if it does not
encourage banks to monitor and to control operational risk.
Secondly, we analyze bank’s behavior under operational risk capital requirements. The regulatory
capital charge is chosen in order to reduce the moral hazard problem. In line with BIA, we compute
the minimal capital charge for operational risk such that well capitalized banks (banks complying
with regulation) always reduce their exposure to this type of risk. We find that BIA does not
2Basel II clause 663 (a): The bank must have an operational risk management system with clear responsibilities
assigned to an operational risk management function. The operational risk management function is responsible for
developing strategies to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate operational risk; for codifying firm-level policies
and procedures concerning operational risk management and controls.
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really create incentives to reduce the operational risk exposure. Thereby, BIA can be treated as
counterproductive, since banks operate better under no operational risk capital charge.
Finally, coherent with the spirit of Basel II, we compute capital charges that depend on the bank’s
operational risk exposure. By adjusting operational risk capital charge to bank’s risk exposure,
regulator rewards good banks by imposing less capital charge on them. We show that under AMA,
regulator can create real incentives to manage operational risk.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews related literature. Section 3 sets up
the model and provides essential theoretical basis for the further analysis . Section 4 analyzes the
behavior of the bank when there are no operational risk capital requirements. Section 5 characterizes
operational risk capital charges which ensure that banks, complying with regulation, will always exert
effort.
2. Related Literature Review
The literature on bank regulation is huge.3 Here we briefly review two branches of the literature
that are closely related to our work. Built on Merton (1977), a first strand of literature addresses
the design of credit capital requirements. Bhattacharya et al (2002) assume unobservable bank’s
capital and random audit. They compute an optimal closure rule that eliminates risk-shifting in-
centives for well-capitalized banks. Decamps et al (2004) analyze the articulation between market
capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline. They compute the minimal capital
requirement that pushes banks to monitor their investment and they show that, if the moral hazard
problem is not so big, market discipline helps to reduce the required capital. Fries et al (1997) ex-
amine the interaction between optimal closure rules and bail-out subsidiary policies. They derive a
closure rule that minimizes expected discounted social bankruptcy costs and the costs of monitoring
banks that continue to operate. Dangl and Lehar (2004) compare Value-at-Risk based risk capital
3For a recent review of literature see Santos (2001) or Stolz (2002).
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requirements and Building Block Approach of the 1988 Basel I accord when the regulator makes ran-
dom audit. They conclude that Value-at-Risk based risk capital requirements give well capitalized
banks stronger incentives to reduce risk. In these studies, banks’ assets follow a geometric Brownian
motion and bankruptcy is considered as endogenous. In accordance with this literature, we share the
view that capital requirements should be set in order to reduce the moral hazard problem. However,
the cited works do not consider operational risk and ignore liquidity management problems.
A second branch of literature considers liquidity management. Milne and Robertson (1996)
analyze optimal business and dividend policy when firm’s cash reserves follows a drift Brownian
motion. The firm pays dividend in excess of a certain barrier and switches to a more profitable/risky
technology as cash reserves increase. Milne and Whalley (2001) extend this work to make bank’s
capital endogenous. They assume fixed costs for bank’s recapitalization. They find that capital
requirements may explain the credit crunch. Belhaj (2010a) models operational risk by jumps with
fixed size. He finds that operational risk may push the bank to take more risk and to reduce its
excess capital. However, this literature does not address the design of capital requirement, it rather
analyze capital in excess of the required level.
Our work is related to the findings of Rochet and Villeneuve (2010) and Belhaj (2010b). They
analyze the problem of the industrial firm’s insurance against accidents.4 They show that only cash
rich firms choose to insure against shocks. Similarly, a bank with a low level of capital has no
incentive to reduce its exposure to operational losses. Operational risk capital requirements will be
designed in order to reduce the moral hazard problem.
3. The model
We start by giving the mathematical formulation of the problem. (Ω, F, P ) is a probability space,
{Ft}t>0 is a filtration, {wt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion adapted to the filtration and {Nt}t≥0
4Shocks have fixed size in Rochet and Villeneuve (2010) and are exponentially distributed in Belhaj (2010b).
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and {At}t≥0 are two independent Poisson processes. The filtration Ft represents the information
available at time t and all decisions made are based upon this information.
Consider a bank which holds a portfolio of illiquid assets (loans) B. The bank’s cash reserves
evolve according to
(3.1) mt = m0 + (µt+ σwt −
Nt∑
i=1
Yi)B,
where m0 is the initial cash reserves level, µ is the expected cash flow per unit of time, and σ
is the volatility of the cash flow.5 We denote the intensity of the Poisson process Nt by λ and we
assume that the stochastic jumps Yi are independent and have exponential distribution (e
−δy).6 The
Brownian motion corresponds to credit risk and represents small movements of the cash reserves over
a small period of time.7 The one sided Poisson process represents operational risk. We restrict our
attention to operational risk that results in immediate losses. In order to keep the model tractable,
we assume that cash reserves are not remunerated. In practice banks invest cash in a portfolio
market, yielding capital charge for market risk.
The corporate operational function aims to develop policies, procedures and practices to ensure
that operational risk is appropriately identified, measured, monitored and controlled. In practice,
banks can mitigate their operational risk through appropriate internal processes and controls. How-
ever, such activities are costly. Here, we consider that the bank can exert effort in order to reduce
the frequency of operational losses to the level λ (= λ−∆λ); it costs c per unit of time. The decision
to make an effort is made before knowing the realization of audit. We assume that this effort is
5The drifted Brownian process can be seen as a limiting process of Poisson processes.
6The exponential distribution captures the fact that small losses are more frequent than large losses. We could
consider other distributions. This would complicate the model and we should rely on numerical simulations.
7In practice, the credit risk may also contains jumps. Here to keep the model simple, we assume that there are no
jumps in credit risk.
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socially optimal, i.e, the cost of the effort is less than the expected operational losses reduction,
c < ∆λ
δ
. Let et denotes the bank’s decision to make effort or not,
et =


1 when the bank exerts effort ,
0 otherwise.
Further, we assume that the bank’s effort and capital are not observable. This will give rise to
a moral hazard problem. That is the bank ay find it optimal to shirk for small levels of capital.
Therefore, operational risk charge will be designed in order to reduce the moral hazard problem.
Finding the optimal contract stays beyond the scope of this work since it may need more than capital
requirements. We will only focus on the design the operational risk capital requirements.
The regulator has to audit the bank in order to observe it’s capital and effort. Following Merton
(1978), we model the random audit by a Poisson process At with intensity ψ. The probability
that an audit takes place in the period of time dt is equal to ψdt. We also assume that the audit
probability is independent of the previous audit result;
dAt =


1 with probability ψdt,
0 with probability (1− ψ)dt.
We assume that equity issue is prohibitively costly.8 Therefore, the bank is closed when its capital
becomes less than the sum of operational risk capital charge (ORC) and credit risk capital charges
(CRC): m+B−D ≤ CRC+ORC. To focus on operational risk capital charge, we consider for the
further analysis that the book value of bank’s illiquid asset B net of its debt D is equal to the credit
risk capital requirements.9 Hence, absent operational risk capital requirements, the bank would
be closed by the manager the first time when its level of cash reserves falls below zero (liquidity
problem). In the presence of operational risk capital charge, the bank will be closed either by the
8It is more realistic to assume assume fixed costs for equity issue as Milne and Whalley (2001). We would obtain
qualitatively the same results, however we should rely on numerical simulations
9 Because of credit risk capital requirements, banks should choose a level B-D larger than CRC. But, banks want
to minimize B-D because the cost of capital is larger than the return on internal funds. Therefore, the assumption
that B-D=CRC seems reasonable.
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manager if it’s capital falls below zero or by the regulator if an audit reveals its incompliance with
operational risk capital requirements. We also assume limited liability of the bank and consider
bank’s asset B to be normalized to one. Henceforwards, cash reserves parameter m should be
interpreted as the ratio of the book value of excess bank’s capital (with respect to required credit
risk capital) to the total illiquid asset.
The bank’s manager has control over the dividend payments. A dividend policy Lt represents the
cumulated dividends payed up to time t. L is an adapted right-continuous non decreasing process
with 0 ≤ ∆Lt ≤ mt for all t ≥ 0 P − a.s. This condition states that the manager cannot pay an
amount of dividends larger than cash reserves. We denote Π the set of all admissible dividend and
effort strategies.
Under the manager’s control, the cash reserves evolve according to
(3.2) dmL, et = (µ− et.c)dt+ σdwt − λ(et)dNtYNt − dLt,
We consider that the bank’s manager acts in the interest of shareholders. She chooses a dividend
policy and the effort level to maximize the expected value of future dividend payments. We denote
by v the optimal value function,
(3.3) v(m) = sup
(L, e)∈Π
E
∫ τ(L,e)
0
e−ρtdLt/m0 = m,
where ρ is the discount factor and τL = inf{t/mt ≤ I{At=1}ORC} is the bankruptcy time.
Let us introduce the following operators
(3.4)
A(e)v(m) =
1
2
σ2v′′(m)+(µ−ec)v′(m)−(ρ+ψI{m≤ORC})v(m)+λ(e)δ
∫ +∞
0
(v(m−y)−v(m)) exp(−δy)dy.
and
(3.5) DV (m) = A(1)V (m)−A(0)V (m) = ∆λδ
∫ +∞
0
(V (m)− V (m− y)) exp(−δy)dy − cV ′(m).
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Function DV measures the benefits from the efforts. They are equal to the gain from the risk-
exposure reduction net of the efforts cost multiplied by the marginal value of cash.
Using stochastic optimal control techniques, we can show that if the optimal value function v is
C2, then it satisfies the following HJB equation:
(3.6) Max(A(0)v,A(1)v, 1 − v′) = 0,
with v(0) = 0.
However, finding a solution of (3.6) does not guarantee that it is the value function. The following
lemma gives necessary conditions for optimality. The proof is omitted, since it relies on standard
verification techniques.
Lemma 3.1. Let V a twice continuously differentiable concave solution of (3.4) with bounded first
derivative then V is the optimal value function.
The following result will be useful.10 Consider the following integro-differential equation
(3.7)
1
2
σ2V ′′(m) + µV ′(m)− (ρ+ λ)V (m) + λδ
∫ +∞
0
(V (m− y)) exp(−δy)dy = 0.
Differentiating this equation yields
(3.8)
1
2
σ2V ′′′(m) + µV ′′ − (ρ+ λ)V ′(m)− λδ2
∫ +∞
0
(V (m− y)) exp(−δy)dy + V (m)) = 0.
Combining these equalities, we obtain
(3.9)
1
2
σ2V ′′′(m) + (µ+
1
2
δσ2)V ′′(m)− (δµ− (ρ+ λ)V ′(m)− δρV (m) = 0.
We define the polynomial
(3.10) P(µ,ρ,λ)(d) =
1
2
σ2d3 + (µ+
1
2
δσ2)d2 + (µδ − (ρ+ λ))d − δρ.
10This result is derived in Belhaj (2010b).
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This polynomial satisfies the following conditions:
lim
θ→−∞
P (θ) = −∞, P (−δ) = δλ > 0, P (0) = −δρ < 0, and lim
θ→+∞
P (θ) = +∞.
Thus, it has three real zeros d1, d2, and d3 such that d1 < −δ < d2 < 0 < d3. In such a way,
solutions of eq (3.9) can be written as linear combinations of ed1m, ed2m and ed3m.
Solutions of A(0)V (m) = 0 with V (0) = 0 are proportional to the following function
(3.11) f(m) = a1e
θ1m + a2e
θ2m + a3e
θ3m,
where θ1, θ2, and θ3 are the three reals zeros of P(µ,ρ+ψ,λ), a1 =
1
2σ
2(θ22 − θ
2
3) + µ(θ2 − θ3), a2 =
1
2σ
2(θ21 − θ
2
3) + µ(θ1 − θ3), and a3 =
1
2σ
2(θ22 − θ
2
1) + µ(θ2 − θ1) . We will see later on that for small
cash reserves, the value function is proportional to f .
Solutions of A(1)V (m) = 0 are linear combinations of eα1m, eα2m, and eα3m, where α1, α2, and
α3 are the three real zeros of P(µ−c,ρ,λ).
The following two lemmas will be useful for the purpose of our analysis.
Lemma 3.2. The equation DU(m) = 0, has at most one solution if U is a C2 increasing and
concave function.
Let m¯ =inf{m ≥ 0, f ′′(m) = 0}. This level corresponds to the optimal dividend barrier of an
unregulated bank that has no control over its operational risk exposure.
Lemma 3.3. The equation Df(m) = 0 with m ∈ [0, m¯], has exactly one solution.
The previous two lemma give us an idea about the optimal exercise of effort. That is, if the value
function is C2 and concave, it is optimal to exert effort only for cash reserves larger than a critical
level.
4. No Operational Risk Capital Charge
In this section, we will analyze the bank’s optimal policies when there is no operational risk
capital requirements (ORC = 0). Bank is liquidated only when the level of cash reserves falls below
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zero. This problem has been studied by Belhaj (2010b) for c = λ¯
δ
and λ = 0, i.e, the effort fully
eliminates operational risk. Here we extend his results considering λ ≥ 0 and for c ≤ ∆λ
δ
.
First of all, note that it is not optimal to exert effort near liquidation threshold, since Dv(0) =
−λ
δ
v′(0) < 0. Now, let us define f0 as in eq (3.11) with ψ = 0 and let me be the solution of
Df0(m) = 0. At the threshold me, the costs of effort is equal to its benefits. Now, consider the
following strategy: the bank pays dividends in excess of a level m∗ and exerts effort only when cash
reserves become larger than me.
The corresponding value function V is the solution of
(4.1)


A(0)V (m) = 0 for m ≤ me
A(1)V (m) = 0 for m ∈ [me,m
∗]
V ′(m) = 1 for m ≥ m∗.
The solution of (4.1) can be written as
(4.2) V (m) =


f0(m)
g′0(m
∗) for m ∈ [0, me]
g0(m)
g′0(m
∗) for m ∈]me, m
∗]
g0(m
∗)
g′0(m
∗) +m−m
∗ for m ≥ m∗,
with
(4.3) g0(m) = b1e
α1m + b2e
α2m + b3e
α3m.
The parameters b1, b2, and b3 are chosen in order to ensure that V is C
2, that is g0(me) = f0(me),
g′0(me) = f
′
0(me), and g
′′
0 (me) = f
′′
0 (me). Let B and M be two 3× 3 matrices with bij = α
i−1
j e
αjme
and mij = θ
i−1
j e
θjme . Therefore, we obtain b = B−1M × a.
Optimizing V with respect to the dividend barrier m∗ yields g′′0 (m
∗) = 0. The following lemma
ensures that the dividend barrier exists.
Lemma 4.1. The equation g′′0 (m) = 0 has at least one solution.
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Now, let m∗0 = inf{m, g
′′
0 (m) = 0} and let V be the corresponding value function. We obtain the
following result.
Proposition 4.2. The function V is the optimal value function. The threshold m∗0 is the optimal
dividend policy barrier. And, it is optimal for the bank to exert effort only when the level of cash
reserves exceeds the threshold me.
The optimal dividend policy is a barrier strategy. The bank keeps cash inside for small levels of
capital and distributes everything in excess of m∗0 as dividends. The bank mitigates its operational
risk by holding capital to absorb losses and also by reducing its operational risk exposure. However,
only well-capitalized banks (m > me) reduce their operational risk exposure. For under-capitalized
banks, the marginal value of cash is too high and the bank is more likely to go bankrupt because
of credit risk rather than operational risk. Therefore, the bank does not exert effort and prefers to
keep cash (instead of finance effort costs) in order to insure itself against downside credit risk.
5. Operational Risk Capital Charges
In the previous section, we have found that, absent operational risk capital charge, banks with
small levels of capital have no incentive to reduce their exposure to operational risk . This gives
a rationale for operational risk capital requirements. We also have shown that banks optimally
hold capital in excess of the required credit capital to absorb future operational and credit losses.
Therefore, imposing a capital charge would be counter productive if it does not encourage banks
to reduce their operational risk exposure. Here, we adopt the view that operational risk capital
charges should be computed in a way that ensures that banks, complying with the regulatory capital
requirements (well capitalized banks), will choose to reduce their exposure to operational risk.11
11The same approach has been used in Bhattacharya et al (2002) to determine a closure rule that eliminates risk
shifting for banks with asset values larger than the required level.
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5.1. Basic Indicator Approach. First, we start by analyzing the case when operational risk
capital is fixed. This means that reducing operational risk exposure does not affect the required
capital. This idea is coherent with the BIA. Since bank’s capital is unobservable, capital requirements
cannot prevent shirking for all banks. In order to prevent shirking for well capitalized banks, the level
of operational risk capital charge k should be chosen in such way that the benefits from efforts is larger
than its costs for those banks. That is for all m > k, Dv(m) > 0. Let k = inf{m > 0, Df(m) = 0}
with f defined in equation (3.11). As in Proposition (4.2), we can show that the bank exerts effort
only when cash reserves are larger than k and that the optimal value function is given by
(5.1) V (m) =


f(m)
g′(m∗1)
for m ∈ [0, k]
g(m)
g′(m∗1)
for m ∈ [k,m∗1]
g(m∗1)
g′(m∗e)
+m−m∗1 for m ≥ m
∗
1,
with
(5.2) g(m) = c1e
α1m + c2e
α2m + c3e
α3m.
Parameters c1,c2, and c3 are chosen in order to ensure that V is C
2, that is g(k) = f(k), g′(k) = f ′(k),
and g′′(k) = f ′′(k). The level m∗1 is the optimal dividend barrier, it is defined as the inf{m >
0, g′′(m) = 0}. Technically, compared to the previous section, the discount rate will be increased by
the amount ψ in the region [0, k]. We obtain the following:
Proposition 5.1. The level k is the minimal operational risk capital charge ensuring that well
capitalized banks always exert effort.
Note that operational risk capital requirements cannot induce under capitalized banks to reduce
their operational risk exposure since, when bank capital falls below the level k, the marginal value
of internal funds becomes larger than the benefits of operational risk reduction.12. The point is
12Dangl and Lehar (2004) find that regulatory capital requirements do not prevent distressed banks from increasing
their asset risk.
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that operational risk capital charge artificially increases the discount rate in the region [0, k] by the
amount ψ. The latter means that the bank becomes more impatient, discounting future cash at a
higher rate. This decreases both the marginal value of internal cash and the benefits from effort.
Proposition (5.1) allows us to analyze the effect of an increase of the operational risk capital
requirements on bank’s behavior. If the initial required capital is less than k, an increase of its
level to k would make the banking industry more stable, i.e, surviving banks will be less exposed
to large losses. However, when required capital is larger than k, the bank always starts exerting
efforts at the level k (since we still have Df(k1) = 0). Thereby, the rise of operational risk capital
requirements will increase the probability of failure and will have no effect on bank’s operational
risk exposure. Hence, the level k seems to be the best candidate for operational risk capital charge
from an incentive perspective.
However, an important question is raised. Does operational risk capital charge really creates
incentive to exert effort under BIA? In other words, is the level k less than me (the level at which a
bank would start exerting effort in the absence of operational risk capital requirements)? Numerical
simulations shows that k is larger than me. This means that an unregulated bank operates better
than a BIA-regulated one. Therefore, this approach can be seen as counterproductive, since it does
not really create incentives to exert effort. Under BIA, banks will consider operational risk capital
charge as an extra cost.
5.2. Advanced Measurement Approach. So far, we have considered that operational risk capital
requirements is independent from the bank’s operational risk exposure. Under AMA, the regulator
can adjust operational risk capital charge to the bank’s operational risk exposure. He rewards goods
banks, that make risk-preventing effort, by imposing on them less capital charge. Let ORC1 be the
operational risk charge for good banks (e=1) and ORC0 be the operational risk capital charge for
bad banks. It is important to note that ORC1 should be less than than k, otherwise there is no
need to adjust the required capital to bank’s operational risk exposure.
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The gain from effort is now given by
(5.3) ∆V (m) = DV (m) + I{m∈[ORC1, ORC0] and e=1}ψV (m)
By exerting effort in the region [ORC1, ORC0], good banks obtain an extra gain measured by ψV .
Assume that ORC0 is sufficiently large. Let k1 = inf{m > 0, ∆f(m) = 0} = inf{m >
0, Df(m) = −ψf(m)}. Note that k1 ∈]0, k[ since ∆f(0) < 0 and ∆f(k) > 0. We can show
that, if ORC1 = k1, the bank exerts effort only for m larger than k1, and chooses its dividend
barrier policy at the level m∗2. Consequently, the value function is given by
(5.4) V (m) =


f(m)
h′(m∗2)
for m ∈ [0, k1]
h(m)
h′(m∗2)
for m ∈]k1, m
∗
2]
h(m∗2)
h′(m∗2)
+m−m∗2 for m ≥ m
∗
2,
with
(5.5) h(m) = h1e
α1m + h2e
α2m + h3e
α3m.
The parameters h1,h2, and h3 are chosen in order to insure that h(k1) = f(k1), h
′(k1) = f
′(k1), and
h′′(k1) = f
′′(k1). The level m
∗
2 is defined as the inf{m > 0, h
′′(m) = 0}.
We obtain the following:
Proposition 5.2. The capital charge k1 is the minimal operational risk capital charge for good banks
ensuring that well capitalized banks always exert efforts.
The level k1 is less than k since Df(k1) < 0. This result is due to the adjustment of the required
capital to the bank’s operational risk exposure. In that way, the regulator lowers the required capital
for good banks with respect to required capital computed under BIA. Thus, setting operational risk
charges for good banks equal to k1 ensures that all banks with capital levels larger than k1 will
exert effort. However, since bank’s effort is not observable, capital requirements cannot give full
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incentives for banks to always reduce their operational risk exposure , i.e, under-capitalized banks
have no incentives to monitor their operational risk.
Now we discuss the choice of the level ORC0. Some shirking incentives may appear for levels of
capital larger than ORC0 since the extra gain ψV vanishes. The level ORC0 has to be chosen in
order to prevent these shirking incentives. In other words, the difference between ORC0 and ORC1
should be sufficiently large in order to ensure that the gain from the effort at ORC+0 is positive,
DV (ORC0) ≥ 0. We have that Dh(k1) = Df(k1) < 0, Dh(m
∗
2) > 0, and h is concave in the interval
]k1, m
∗
2[. Hence, by lemma 3.2, the equation Dh(m) = 0 has exactly one solution k0 in ]k1, m
∗
2[.
We obtain the following straightforward result.
Proposition 5.3. The capital charge k0 is the minimal operational risk capital charge for bad banks
ensuring that well capitalized banks always exert effort.
Differentiating operational risk capital requirement in accordance with risk exposure, the regulator
provides banks a real incentive to monitor their operational risk. The regulator rewards good banks
by imposing less capital charge on theme. Note that no banks would be closed for a cash reserves
larger than k1, since the adequate choice of operational risk capital charges will induce good behavior
when the level of cash exceeds k1. It is worthwhile to note that the choice of k0 is not crucial here. It
is sufficient to close the bank if an audit reveals that it does not exert effort. However, in that case,
the regulator needs to know k0 in order to avoid unnecessary audit of bank’s effort if an audit reveals
that the bank’s capital level is larger than k0. To summarize, the best candidates for operational
risk capital requirements satisfy ∆f(k1) = 0 and Dh(k0) = 0.
The following example illustrates that capital requirements under AMA may create incentives
to reduce risk exposure, whereas BIA is counterproductive. The level of capital requirements k is
computed under BIA and k1 is computed under AMA. Both of these capital requirements ensure
that well-capitalized banks always exert operational risk preventive effort.
Example: µ = 0.01, δ = 1000, c = 0.001, λ = 2, λ = 0, σ = 0.0035, ρ = 0.05.
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ψ 0 (no ORC) 0.5 1 2 5 6
k 4.45% 4.47% 4.50% 4.57% 4.78% 4.86%
k1 4.45% 3.51% 2.93% 2.23% 1.32% 1.16%
In this example, expected operational losses represent 20% of expected cash flow. In the absence
of operational risk capital requirements, the bank starts exerting effort at the 4.45% level of excess
capital to total illiquid asset. We remark that k is slowly increasing with the frequency of audit,
whereas k1 is decreasing with the level of audit .
6. Conclusion
This paper develops a framework to analyze operational risk capital requirements. Under-
capitalized banks have no incentives to monitor their operational risk. Operational risk charge
can be computed in order to enhance banks’ incentives to manage operational risk. Under BIA,
operational risk capital is counterproductive. Aligning the required capital with bank’s risk is more
efficient in reducing the moral hazard problem. This work can be straightforwardly extended to
cover a richer setting. We can allow for the remuneration of cash reserves, other distribution of
jumps and the introduction of two types of operational risk; one that can be controlled and the
other not. We can also introduce fixed recapitalization costs. However, it is not not possible to
obtain closed form solutions for the value function. Therefore we should rely on numerical solutions.
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7. Appendix
Proof of lemma 3.2 Let U a C2 increasing and concave function. We have (DU)′(m) =
−δDU(m)+ (∆λ− δc)U ′(m)− cU ′′(m). As we have ∆λ− δc ≥ 0 then we obtain that if DU(m) = 0
then (DU)′(m) > 0. This means that the equation DU(m) = 0 has at most one solution.
Proof of lemma 3.3 Define V (m) = f(m)
f ′(m¯) for m ≤ m¯. The function V is concave
13 and satisfies
the following properties V ′′(m¯) = 0 and V ′(m¯) = 1. We have µ − (ρ + ψ)V (m¯) + λδ
∫ +∞
0 (V (m −
y) − V (m¯)) exp(−δy)dy = 0, then DV (m¯) = ∆λ−(ρ+ψ)V (m¯)+µ
λ
− c. Since c ≤ ∆λ
δ
, we obtain
DV (m¯) ≥ ∆λ
−(ρ+ψ)V (m¯)+µ−λ
δ
λ
> 0. As V is concave and V ′(m) < 1 for m < m¯, we can easily show
that (ρ+ψ)V (m¯) < µ− λ
δ
. Therefore, we obtain DV (m¯) > 0. We also have DV (0) = −λ
δ
V ′0 (0) < 0.
As DV is continuous, there is me ∈ [0, m¯] such that DV (me) = 0 (or Df(me) = 0 . Note that f
is C2, increasing, and concave in [0, m¯]. Using lemma 3.2, we obtain that the equation Df(m) = 0
with m ∈ [0, m¯], has exactly one solution.
Proof of lemma 4.1 Consider the barrier policy at m˜ = µ−c
ρ+ψ , and assume that for all m < m˜,
g′′0 (m) < 0. Then the corresponding value function V (m) (defined similarly as in eq (4.2)) is concave.
Since A(1)V (m˜) = 0, then we have µ− c− (ρ+ ψ + λ)V (m) + λδ
∫ +∞
0
(V (m− y)) exp(−δy)dy = 0.
We obtain that V (m˜) < m˜. This contradicts V ′(m) > 1 for m < m˜.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 First, we show that it is optimal to exert effort only for cash reserves
larger than me. Note that V is twice continuously differentiable and concave by construction. By
Lemma (3.2) and (3.3), we have that DV (m) = 0 has only one solution. Since DV (0) < 0, it follows
that A(0)V (m) > A(1)V (m) for m < me, and A(0)V (m) < A(1)V (m) for m > me.
13V is the optimal value function when the bank has no control over its operational risk.
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Second, we show that the barrier policy at m∗ is optimal.
Form > m∗, we have V ′(m) = 1. Then, we need to show that the function V satisfies A(1)V (m) ≤
0 for m > m∗.
Let m > m∗, we have V (m) = V (m∗) + m − m∗ and A(1)V (m) = µ − c − (ρ + λ)V (m) +
λδ
∫ +∞
0 (V (m− y) exp(−δy)dy.
We differentiate the equation above, we obtain
A(1)V ′(m) = −(ρ+ λ) + λδ
∫m
0
(V ′(m− y) exp(−δy)dy.
We use integration by part, we find
A(1)V ′(m) = −(ρ+ λ) + λδ(V (m)− δ
∫m
0 V (m− y) exp(−δy)dy).
Combining these two equations we obtain
A(1)V ′(m) + δA(1)V (m) = δ(µ− c)− (ρ+ λ)− δρV (m)
Since A(1)V (m∗) = 0, we obtain A(1)V ′(m) + δA(1)V (m) = A(1)V ′(m∗)− δρ(m−m∗).
Using equation (3.9) (we replace µ by µ− c and ρ by ρ+ψ in eq (3.9)), we obtain A(1)V ′(m∗) =
1
2σ
2V ′′′((m∗)−) < 0. Therefore we have A(1)V ′(m) + δA(1)V (m) < 0 and A(1)V ′(m∗) < 0. It can
be easily shown (by contradiction) that A(1)V (m) < 0 for all m > m∗.
Proof proposition 5.1 Let z the smallest level at which the bank exerts effort. We have that
the optimal value function v is proportional to the function f in the interval [0,min(z,ORC)].
First case: m¯ > ORC > k, as f is concave and Df(k) = 0, then we obtain Df(m) < 0 for all
m < k. Since the value function is concave, we obtain by lemma 3.2 that Dv(m) > 0 iff m > k.
That is the bank exerts effort only for cash reserves larger than k.
Second case: ORC < k, we have Df(ORC) < 0 or equivalently Dv(ORC) < 0. Therefore, the
bank does not exert effort in the neighborhoods of ORC.
Proof proposition 5.2
Let z the smallest level at which the bank exerts effort. We distinguish between two cases:
First case: k > ORC1 ≥ k1; We will show that z = ORC1. We have that, for all m ≤ ORC1, the
gain form effort is given by Dv(m) < 0 (Df(m) < 0 since m ≤ ORC1 < k). Therefore we obtain
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z ≥ ORC1. As we have ORC1 > k1 and ∆f(k1) = 0, applying lemma ?? (f is concave in the interval
[0, k]) we obtain that ∆f(ORC1) > 0 or equivalently ∆v(ORC1) > 0. Therefore, the bank starts
exerting effort at the level ORC1.
Second case: ORC1 < k1; For all m ≤ ORC1 the gain form effort is given by Dv(m) < 0 since
ORC1 < k1. Therefore, we obtain z > ORC1.
